A sentence completion procedure as an alternative to the Autobiographical Memory Test for assessing overgeneral memory in non-clinical populations by Raes, Filip et al.
A sentence completion procedure as an alternative to
the Autobiographical Memory Test for assessing
overgeneral memory in non-clinical populations
Filip Raes and Dirk Hermans
University of Leuven, Belgium
J. Mark G. Williams
University of Oxford, UK
Paul Eelen
University of Leuven, Belgium
Overgeneral memory (OGM) has been proposed as a vulnerability factor for depression (Williams et al.,
2007) or depressive reactivity to stressful life-events (e.g., Gibbs & Rude, 2004). Traditionally, a cue word
procedure known as the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986) is used to
assess OGM. Although frequently and validly used in clinical populations, there is evidence suggesting
that the AMT is insufficiently sensitive to measure OGM in non-clinical groups. Study 1 evaluated the
usefulness of a sentence completion method to assess OGM in non-clinical groups, as an alternative to
the AMT. Participants were 197 students who completed the AMT, the Sentence Completion for Events
from the Past Test (SCEPT), a depression measure, and visual analogue scales assessing ruminative
thinking. Results showed that the mean proportion of overgeneral responses was markedly higher for the
SCEPT than for the standard AMT. Also, overgeneral responding on the SCEPT was positively
associated to depression scores and depressive rumination scores, whereas overgeneral responding on the
AMT was not. Results suggest that the SCEPT, relative to the AMT, is a more sensitive instrument to
measure OGM, at least in non-clinical populations. Study 2 further showed that this enhanced sensitivity
is most likely due to the omission of the instruction to be specific rather than to the SCEPT’s sentence
completion format (as opposed to free recall to cue words).
It is widely agreed that autobiographical memory
(AM) is essential to human functioning (for
elaborate discussions of this point, see Conway
& Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Nelson & Fivush, 2004).
‘‘AM’’ has often been conceptualised as a subset
of episodic memory. Alternatively, AM has also
often been used synonymously with the term
‘‘episodic memory’’. We agree with recent authors
(e.g., Conway, 1990, 2001, 2005) that both those
conceptualisations of AM are misleading, and that
episodic and autobiographical memory are best
treated as two different, non-equivalent memory
systems. Episodic memory contains personally
experienced specific past events that lasted from
minutes to hours. AM, however, is a more
encompassing system, containing not only specific
experience-near (episodic) self-related knowledge
high in sensory-perceptual detail, but also more
generic conceptual self-related material which is
more semantic in nature. This view of AM as a
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ranging from specific episodic events to more
generic semantic self-related information is re-
flected in, for example, Conway’s framework
of the Self-Memory System (SMS; Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, Singer & Tagini,
2004), and this view is also consistent with multi-
ple-memory models (e.g., Johnson, 1992; see
Williams et al., 2007).
When people are asked to retrieve a specific
personal event, e.g., in response to cue words,
such (strategic) retrieval most often reflects a
staged process, beginning with the retrieval of
more conceptual abstract (semantic-generic) self-
related information moving on to more event-
specific (episodic) self-related material high in
sensory-perceptual detail (see Conway & Pley-
dell-Pearce, 2000; Williams et al., 2007). Interest-
ingly, a recent line of study in the field of AM has
focused on that very feature of personal mem-
ories; that is, the level of specificity (vs generality)
with which such self-related knowledge is re-
trieved. More specifically, results obtained during
the past 20 years have consistently shown that
depressed people have more difficulty retrieving
specific memories from AM than non-depressed
people and generate relatively more personal
information from the more semantic-generic level
of autobiographical knowledge (see Williams
et al., 2007, for a review).
In that (clinically oriented) research domain,
the Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT;
Williams & Broadbent, 1986) has most often
been used. In the AMT respondents are in-
structed to retrieve a specific memory in response
to cue words (e.g., sad, happy). A specific
memory refers to a personal past experience
that happened on a particular day and did not
last longer than a single day (e.g., ‘‘I had good fun
at my brother’s wedding two years ago’’). As
compared to non-depressed controls, depressed
people generate relatively more overgeneral
memories to cue words on the AMT (e.g., ‘‘the
times I go out for a drink’’, rather than ‘‘that
Friday evening when we went for a drink at the
Hopduvel in Ghent with some colleagues after a
meeting’’).
This particular memory phenomenon has been
termed overgeneral memory (OGM) and refers to
a tendency in some people, notably depressed
ones, to retrieve past experiences in an over-
general way; that is, either in the form of so-called
overgeneral categoric memories or as overgeneral
semantic associations. Categoric memories refer
to summaries of similar events (e.g., ‘‘every time
I have to say goodbye or let go of something’’).
Overgeneral semantic associations refer to over-
general (personal) semantic information (e.g.,
‘‘my mum’’, ‘‘my husband’’, ‘‘my home’’).
1 Ac-
cording to recent theorising (e.g., Conway &
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2004;
Williams et al., 2007), semantic associates are
situated at an even higher level than ‘‘categoric
memories’’ in the hierarchy of memory retrieval.
One could thus say that these semantic associates
constitute a sort of ‘‘over-overgeneral’’ response.
As such, they are also*and maybe even more so
than categoric memories*an indication of OGM
(Williams, 2000).
2 Consider the following exam-
ple. When a person responds ‘‘home’’ (i.e., a
semantic associate) to the cue happy, this could
be regarded as an over-overgeneral categoric
memory. It collapses over categoric memories
such as: ‘‘moments with my children, playing in
our garden’’, ‘‘when I’m with my husband, watch-
ing television in our living room’’, ‘‘when my
husband and children join me for dinner in our
kitchen’’, ‘‘enjoying the sun while reading a book
in my rocking chair on the terrace’’, ‘‘moments
with my cat Felix in the couch’’, etc. In line with
this, OGM will be defined here as the retrieval of
overgeneral categoric and overgeneral personal
semantic information. The inclusion of semantic
associates in the categoric code is in line with
recent theoretical models of AM (see above)
1 Respondents sometimes retrieve overgeneral memories
to cues that are not categoric but extended in that they refer to
an extended period of time (lasting longer than a day).
Examples of such overgeneral extended memories are ‘‘when I
was in high-school’’, ‘‘my time as a student in Leuven’’, ‘‘my
holiday in Zimbabwe last year’’. Subsequent studies following
the seminal study of Williams and Broadbent (1986) made
clear that overgeneral memory observed in clinical groups,
such as in depressed and suicidal patients, is attributable to an
increase in the categoric type of overgeneral memories (e.g.,
Barnhofer, de Jong-Meyer, Kleinpass, & Nikesch, 2002;
Williams & Dritschel, 1992), but not the extended type.
2 In fact, at the AMT Consensus Meeting (Williams, 2000),
it was explicitly mentioned that semantic associates are indeed
to be situated at a higher level in the hierarchy of
overgenerality, and thus are to be regarded as sort of over-
overgeneral memories. Since that meeting, it was
recommended that if researchers wish to score the specificity
of AMT responses on a numeric scale, semantic associates
should be given the lowest score (i.e., ‘‘1’’), with categoric
memories given a ‘‘2’’, extended memories a ‘‘3’’, and specific
memories a ‘‘4’’. However, researchers have never really used
this way of scoring AMT responses. By tradition, researchers
mainly just look at the amount or proportion of categoric and
specific responses, but not semantic associates.
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from an expert consensus meeting (see also
Footnote 2).
Research has also clearly demonstrated that
OGM is not a simple mood-dependent epiphe-
nomenon of depression. Rather, it appears to
represent a stable characteristic of depressed
and formerly depressed individuals. So it has
been shown that OGM remains stable in spite
of recovery from the depression and that it
is predictive of an unfavourable course (e.g.,
Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993;
Peeters, Wessel, Merckelbach, & Boon-Vermee-
ren, 2002; Raes et al., 2006a). Hence, OGM is
regarded as a vulnerability factor for depressive
relapse or chronic depression.
Consistent with OGM as a vulnerability factor
for depression, it remains present when pa-
tients are recovered (e.g., Mackinger, Pachinger,
Leibetseder, & Fartacek, 2000a), and predicts
emotional (depressed) reactivity to stressful life
events in populations that are not suffering
from clinical significant pathology. Van Minnen,
Wessel, Verhaak, and Smeenk (2005) investigated
the relationship between OGM and emotional
reactivity to a failed in vitro fertilisation treat-
ment (IVF) in women, measuring memory speci-
ficity prior to the stressful event (the bad news). It
was found that OGM on the AMT was related
to a greater increase in depressive symptoms. A
similar pattern emerged in a study by Gibbs and
Rude (2004) who found that a higher frequency
of negative life events (over a 4 6-week period)
led to a significant greater increase in depressive
symptoms for students with high levels of OGM
at baseline than for low-OGM students, and low-
OGM students with low frequencies of stressful
life events. Similarly, Mackinger, Loschin, and
Leibetseder (2000b) reported that the change in
depressive symptomatology from assessment dur-
ing pregnancy to post-delivery in a non-clinical
sample of pregnant women was significantly
predicted by memory overgenerality: The more
overgeneral memories retrieved during preg-
nancy, the less reduction or the greater the
increase in depressive affect 3 months after
delivery (for a replication, see Hipwell, Reynolds,
& Crick, 2004). Note that baseline depres-
sion levels were controlled for at all times in
those prediction studies. Most importantly for the
present discussion, it should be noted that the
above reviewed studies were all conducted in
populations that were not suffering from clinical
significant pathology at baseline. Respondents in
the Hipwell et al. (2004) study, for example, in
which OGM was predictive of depressive symp-
toms post-delivery, obtained baseline scores on a
number of instruments that were comparable
with those of ‘‘never-depressed’’ non-childbearing
controls reported by Teasdale and Cox (2001). In
other words, OGM not only constitutes a vulner-
ability factor for prolonged depression or depres-
sive relapse, but also likely represents a marker of
depressed reactivity and, possibly, a vulnerability
factor for a first onset of depression in never-
depressed individuals.
Given this trait-marker quality of OGM, the
AMT might prove a useful tool to screen people
at risk for depression or depressive relapse. So in
terms of secondary prevention, it may help us
target preventive interventions to the appropriate
groups. As for primary prevention, it would then
be useful to identify depression-prone people
(‘‘overgeneral retrievers’’) in non-clinical groups
as well. However, to date the AMT has rarely
been applied in non-clinical populations. The
majority of studies that have used the AMT
were conducted in clinical, most often depressed
or formerly depressed populations. Over the last
5 years, our research group has acquired con-
siderable experience with the use of the AMT in
non-clinical groups*in particular in students.
Based on the results of a number of our own
unpublished studies, there are good reasons for
doubting the usefulness of the standard AMT to
detect OGM in non-clinical samples.
First of all, the AMT typically leads to a very
low frequency of overgeneral memories in non-
clinical participants (e.g., students). For example,
in three studies that we conducted in students
(De Beer, Hermans, & Raes, 2005; Raes &
Hermans, 2002, 2003), the mean number of over-
general (categoric and semantic) memories on a
10-item AMTwas only.33 (SD .82; n 156), .21
(SD .54; n 97), and .46 (SD .90; n 408),
respectively. One would expect OGM to be more
frequent in these groups, given that the disorder
for which it is regarded as a vulnerability factor
(i.e., depression) is so highly prevalent, especially
in university students, who are known to be at
relatively high risk for depression (e.g., Rude,
Valdez, Odom, & Ebrahimi, 2003). Possibly, the
very extensive instructions, the provision of
practice trials, and the repeated prompting for
specificity in the standard AMT administration
jointly mean that people with an overgeneral
memory retrieval style in a non-clinical popula-
tion still manage to obtain high specificity scores
SENTENCE COMPLETION AND OVERGENERAL MEMORY 497on this task. Or in other words, the task is
insufficiently sensitive.
Second, results with non-clinical respondents
suggest that memory specificity vs overgenerality
as assessed with the AMT is not related to
depressive symptomatology. For example, in a
group of 97 students, correlations between scores
on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck,
Steer, & Brown, 1996) and the number of specific
memories and overgeneral memories retrieved on
the AMT were .02 (p .85) and  .07 (p .51),
respectively (Raes, Pousset & Hermans, 2004).
A median split of scores on the BDI (median 7)
also showed that the low-BDI group did not differ
from the high-BDI group with respect to the
number of overgeneral memories and the number
of specific memories retrieved on the AMT, both
tsB1. The same was true when we compared
those scoring below (n 72) and those above
(n 25) the widely used cut-off BDI score of 14.
If anything, memory specificity is sometimes
related to depression in the opposite direction
to that expected on the basis of AMT studies in
clinical populations, such that those non-clinical
individuals performing relatively well on the
AMT in terms of memory specificity tend to
obtain higher scores on a depression measure. For
example, in a study with 156 students (De Beer
et al., 2005), correlations between scores on the
Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression
scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) and the number of
specific memories and overgeneral memories
were .20 (pB.05) and  .17 (pB.05).
A similar picture seems to be emerging for the
relation between depressive rumination and AM
specificity. Depressive rumination refers to re-
peated abstract-conceptual thinking about one’s
(depressed) feelings and about the possible causes
and consequences of these feelings (Nolen-Hoek-
sema, 1991). Examples of such ruminative
thoughts are: ‘‘Why am I feeling depressed?’’,
‘‘What could have caused these sad feelings?’’,
‘‘Where did it all go wrong?’’, ‘‘What if I don’t
snap out of it?’’, etc. Such a ruminative focus
on the depression has been convincingly shown
to be related to longer and more severe episodes
of depression or dysphoria (for a review, see
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004), and thus seems to re-
present a vulnerability factor for (more severe)
depression. Whereas in clinical populations it
has been repeatedly found that such a rumina-
tive thinking style is positively related to OGM
(Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2004; Raes et al.,
2005; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001, 2004; Watkins,
Teasdale, & Williams, 2000), in non-clinical po-
pulations this relation appears to be absent. For
example, in a recent study in 97 students (Raes
et al., 2004) respective correlations were .05
(p .63) and  .02 (p .92) between the scores
on a rumination measure and the number of
specific and overgeneral memories on the AMT,
respectively. Likewise, a median split of rumina-
tion scores also showed that the low-rumination
group did not differ from the high-rumination
group with respect to the number of overgeneral
memories and the number of specific memories
retrieved on the AMT, both tsB1. The same was
true (tB1) when we compared those scoring
below (n 86) and those above (n 11) a cut-
off rumination score (i.e., the median score on
this rumination measure in a sample of patients
with major depression). Sometimes the relation
between AM specificity and rumination even
tends to be opposite to what can be expected
based on observations in clinical participants. In a
pilot-study (see below), the correlation between a
measure of rumination and the number of specific
AMT memories was .29 (pB.09) in a group of 37
non-clinical respondents.
Why is memory specificity, as measured with
the AMT, not related to depression and depres-
sive rumination in non-clinical respondents as it is
in depressed ones? As already hinted at above,
this may be due to the particular way in which the
AMT is being administered (extensive instruc-
tions, provision of practice trials, and repeated
prompting for specificity). This means that a
subgroup of students who have the tendency to
retrieve their past in an overgeneral way (and
who are thus assumed to be ‘‘at risk’’ for
depression) still manage to come up with specific
memories to cue words when they are explicitly
asked to do so and repeatedly instructed not to
respond with overgeneral material*especially
when they are given 1 minute to do so, and
when it is explicitly mentioned that their job on
this task is to generate specific memories.
3 Once
depressed, however, this overgeneral retrieval
3 And why do these variables, in those cases where they are
related in non-clinical groups, tend to be related in the
opposite direction; that is, the more specific memories
respondents retrieve on the AMT, the higher they score on a
depression measure and on a rumination scale? Possibly,
students who want to do really well on this ‘‘test’’, e.g.,
neurotic individuals, will especially try their very best to come
up with a specific memory (as requested in this task), and to
inhibit all overgeneral thoughts, relative to less neurotic
individuals.
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more and more difficult to inhibit. This implies
that even when students or other groups of non-
clinical participants do respond with specific
memories, it may nevertheless be that some of
them actually do have a tendency to recall past
material in a generalised way; that is, their
preferred level of entry into the autobiographical
knowledge base, or their habitual level at which
they recollect personal information, is situated
relatively higher in the hierarchy of autobiogra-
phical knowledge, i.e., at the generic-semantic (vs
the more specific-episodic) level. The above
reviewed data seem to suggest that the AMT, at
least in non-clinical groups, is not sufficiently
sensitive to detect habitual specificity level of
memory recall.
4 Maybe, then, this marker needs
to be assessed in non-clinical groups using an
alternative method to the AMT. As mentioned,
when the AMT is administered, participants are
explicitly told that the goal of the task or ‘‘test’’ is
to generate specific memories. This way, the AMT
may miss out the detection of non-clinical re-
spondents’ (especially students’) habitual or nat-
uralistic style or ‘‘output’’ of generative/strategic
memory recall (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). An alternative procedure to assess the
level of overgenerality (vs specificity) with which
non-clinical respondents habitually recall perso-
nal or autobiographical knowledge would then
need to elicit memories without explicitly pre-
senting the task as a memory ‘‘test’’, and without
instructing and intensively prompting respon-
dents to generate specific personal events.
In two pilot studies we explored the useful-
ness of such an alternative method to elicit or
detect an overgeneral retrieval style in non-
clinical samples. In a first pilot study (n 37,
Mage 28.9, SD 9.90), we asked respondents to
complete the following sentence stem: ‘‘I still
remember well how ...’’. This stem probes people
to retrieve past experiences, without the explicit
instruction to make it specific experiences. In fact,
no mention what so ever was made of ‘‘mem-
ories’’, ‘‘memory test’’, or ‘‘recalling the past’’.
Following the stem completion, participants were
administered, in this order, the standard AMT
and a rumination scale. A total of 14 participants
filled out the incomplete sentence in a specific
way (e.g., ‘‘I still remember well how I felt the day
I got my driver’s licence’’), whereas 14 others
completed the incomplete sentence with an over-
general statement (e.g., ‘‘I still remember well
how my brother and I used to play with
Playmobil† on Sunday mornings’’). As predicted,
the overgeneral group obtained a higher score on
the rumination scale as compared with the
specific group, t(26) 2.22, pB.05. Thus, this
sentence completion procedure led to a consider-
able amount of overgeneral responses in non-
clinical participants, and this overgeneral
responding was now related to depressive rumi-
nation in a similar way to clinical groups. These
results were replicated in a second pilot study
(n 50; Mage 21.76, SD 2.25). Those partici-
pants who wrote an overgeneral completion
to the sentence stem (n 15) scored significan-
tly higher on a subsequent rumination scale than
those who wrote down a specific experience
(n 35), t(48) 2.07, pB.05.
THE PRESENT STUDIES
Based on the results of these pilot studies, the
possibility of such a sentence completion method
to assess OGM in non-clinical respondents was
further explored in the present studies. In Study 1,
a large group of students was administered a
series of 11 sentence stems which all probe for
past experiences, as well as visual analogue
rumination scales, a depression measure, and
the standard AMT. Our predictions were (1)
that the sentence completion task would elicit
more overgeneral responding than the AMT, (2)
that OGM as measured with the sentences task
would be positively related to depression and
depressive rumination, whereas (3) OGM as
measured with the standard AMT would not
show such a relationship with depression and
rumination.
In Study 2, a sentence completion task with the
explicit instruction to complete sentences with
reference to a specific memory was administered
to student participants, alongside the standard
completion task from Study 1 (which has no
specificity instructions), visual analogue rumina-
tion scales, and a depression measure. The aim of
Study 2 was to explore whether the enhanced
performance of a sentence completion task to
assess OGM is due to the fact that it omits the
4 Absence of any correlation between OGM on the AMT
and measures of depression severity might be indicative of the
AMT’s insensitivity, but this does not necessarily need to be
the case. For example, it might be that OGM, as a trait marker
for depression, only tends to be present/absent as a function of
vulnerability (see our discussion above).
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sentence completion. The more detailed hypoth-
eses for Study 2 are summarised at the end of the
Discussion section of Study 1.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Participants were all first-year psychology
students. They participated in return for course
credit. As testing was spread out over several
time points (see procedural aspects below), only
participants who were present during all sessions
and who filled out all measures involved in the
present study were retained for the analyses.
Also, participants who indicated that they had
already completed an AMT previously, or that
they had not filled out some of the tests seriously
(see later), were dropped from the analyses.
This resulted in a final group of 197 students
(172 women). Their mean age was 18.17 years
(SD 1.43; range 17 33).
Materials
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT).T h e
AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986) was used in
a written format (see Raes, Hermans, de Decker,
Eelen, & Williams, 2003a; Raes, Hermans, Wil-
liams, & Eelen, 2006b). Participants are given a
booklet with 13 pages. On each page, a cue word
is printed. The first two cues are practice items
(grass, bread). The next 10 pages have the test
words: confidence [trust], scared, pleasurable,
angry, courage, sad, calm [at ease], bold, sur-
prised, and stupid.
5 Participants are given 60
seconds to write down a specific memory for
each of the cue words. It is clearly stated in the
instructions that a specific memory is one that
refers to one particular occasion or event that
happened on a particular day at least 1 week
before. All cues are embedded in the frame
sentence ‘‘Can you write down one specific
moment or event that the word X reminds you
of?’’. When the 60-second time limit for a cue is
reached, participants are instructed to turn to the
following cue. Cue words and instructions are
read aloud by the experimenter.
Each response is coded as a specific or a
nonspecific memory. Nonspecific memories are
further coded as either an overgeneral categoric
memory (e.g., ‘‘going out for a drink’’), an over-
general extended memory (e.g., ‘‘when I worked
as a nanny for a year in London’’), semantic
associate (e.g., ‘‘my brother’’), omission, same
event (referring to an event already mentioned),
or incorrect specific (referring to an event of the
past week). Using this scoring procedure, pre-
vious studies that were conducted at our lab
obtained good reliability (Raes et al., 2003a,
2004) with interrater agreement ranging from
92% to 99% (K .83 .96).
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past
Test (SCEPT). The SCEPT comprises 11 sentence
stems probing for past experiences. A sample
item is ‘‘When I think back to/of ...’’. A list of
all items can be found in Appendix 1. Partici-
pants are instructed to provide continuations to
incomplete sentences (for full instructions, see
Appendix 1).
When all sentence stems are completed, parti-
cipants are instructed to assign a code to each of
their responses according to the following sixfold
coding system:
‘‘1’’ (if what you wrote down refers to one
specific moment or a particular time); ‘‘M’’ (if
what you wrote down refers to a repeated
activity or a category of similar events without
the specification of a particular time [the M
stands for ‘‘Meer dan eens’’ or ‘‘Meerdere
keren’’, i.e., ‘‘More than once’’ or ‘‘Multiple
times’’ in English, respectively]); ‘‘ ’’ (if what
you wrote down refers to an extended period of
time which lasted longer than a day); ‘‘?’’ (if
you seriously tried to complete the sentence,
but could not come up with something; i.e., an
omission); ‘‘!’’ (if you had something in mind,
but did not want to write it down for whatever
reason, e.g., too personal [besides the exclama-
tion mark, participants are asked in this case to
further indicate, using a second code, whether
what they had in mind referred to a single
event, ‘‘1’’, a category of similar events, ‘‘M’’,
or an extended time period, ‘‘ ’’]); ‘‘Z’’ (if you
did not seriously try to complete the sentence
in a meaningful way [the Z stands for the
Dutch ‘‘geen Zin om iets serieus te bedenken’’,
5 The Dutch words of the written AMT were vertrouwen,
bang, prettig, boos, moed, droevig, gerust, brutaal, verrast,
and lomp, respectively. The two Dutch practice items were
gras and brood.
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up with something serious’’]).
Afterwards, sentence completions are coded
by the experimenter, using the following coding
categories: ‘‘specific memory’’ (see ‘‘1’’ above);
‘‘categoric memory’’ (see ‘‘M’’ above), ‘‘extended
memory’’ (see ‘‘ ’’ above); and ‘‘omission’’ (see
‘‘?’’ above). If a respondent wrote down ‘‘!’’, then
this response is coded as either a specific, a
categoric, or extended memory, depending on
the second code that this respondent wrote down
to further qualify the exclamation mark. A final
category is ‘‘semantic associate’’ referring to
personal overgeneral semantic information (e.g.,
‘‘I used to be a very shy girl’’, ‘‘I will never forget
what my parents mean to me’’). (See Appendix 2
for sample responses.) In cases where it is not
clear to the experimenter what code a certain
response should best be given, then the respon-
dent’s own code is taken as the final code. A
second independent rater coded the responses of
a random selected sample of 20 participants (i.e.,
10% of the total sample; 220 sentence comple-
tions). Good interrater agreement was shown
(87%, K .82).
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II). The BDI-
II (Beck et al., 1996) is a widely used self-rating
measure for severity of depressive symptoms and
consists of 21 four-choice statements. Participants
are asked to mark the statements that best
describe how they felt during the past 2 weeks.
The Dutch version by van der Does (2002) is
used, for which adequate reliability is reported
with Cronbach’s alpha of .92 and .93 in a
psychiatric and student population, respectively
(van der Does, 2002).
Visual Analogue Rumination Scales (VARS).
Participants are asked to indicate on a 0 to 10
scale (not at all to very often) how much they do
what is described in four statements when they are
sad, down or feel blue: ‘‘I have difficulty getting
myself to stop thinking about how sad I am’’;
‘‘I get absorbed in thinking about why I am sad
and find it difficult to think about other things’’;
‘‘I repeatedly try to figure out, by doing a lot of
thinking, what might be the causes of my sad-
ness’’; ‘‘I keep thinking about how I feel, to
understand myself and my sad feelings better’’.
Summing item scores results in a total rumination
score (range: 0 40). These four statements were
derived from the Leuven Adaptation of the
Rumination on Sadness Scale (LARSS; Raes,
Hermans, Williams, Bijttebier, & Eelen, in press),
which is a revised and extended version of the
Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS; Conway,
Csank, Holm, & Blake, 2000). Factor analyses
revealed three meaningful factors in the RSS and
the LARSS (Raes et al., in press): ‘‘Causal
Analysis’’ (i.e., ruminating about the possible
causes of one’s sadness), ‘‘Understanding’’ (i.e.,
ruminating about the meaning of one’s sadness),
and ‘‘Uncontrollability’’ (i.e., thoughts about the
uncontrollability of ruminative thinking). Items 1
and 2 of the VARS represent the ‘‘Uncontroll-
ability’’ factor of the LARSS. Items 3 and 4 were
selected from the ‘‘Causal Analysis’’ and ‘‘Under-
standing’’ factor of the LARSS, respectively.
Cronbach’s alpha for the four VARS items is
.84. Total scores on the VARS correlate highly
with scores on widely used rumination scales as
the Rumination on Sadness Scale (RSS; Conway
et al., 2000) and the Ruminative Response Scale
(RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), re-
spective rs being .82 and .77, both psB.001
(Raes, Hermans, & Eelen, 2003b).
Procedure
All participants were tested collectively and
participated in return for course credit. During
Session 1, the SCEPT and VARS were adminis-
tered. Two weeks later, participants completed
the BDI-II (Session 2). During Session 3, which
took place another 3 weeks later, the AMT
was administered. Testing was spread over several
sessions to distract participants from guessing the
true nature of the study. The SCEPT was admi-
nistered prior to the AMT to prevent participants
from inferring that the sentence completion task
is about specificity vs overgenerality of personal
past experiences and, thus, to prevent a specific
memory response mode (as instructed in the
AMT) transfering to the SCEPT.
Results and discussion
Our first hypothesis was that the newly developed
sentence completion method (SCEPT) would
lead to a higher prevalence of overgeneral
responding in this non-clinical sample of students
than the standard cue word procedure (AMT).
SENTENCE COMPLETION AND OVERGENERAL MEMORY 501In support of this hypothesis, the mean propor-
tion of completions that were overgeneral on the
SCEPT (M .37, SD .15, range .09 to .80) was
significantly higher than the mean proportion of
memories that were overgeneral in response to
AMT cue words (M .02, SD .04, range .00
to .22), t(196) 31.18, pB.001. Thus, whereas
only a mean of 2% of all responses generated in
response to AMT cue words were overgeneral
memories, a mean of almost 40% of the sentence
completions made on the SCEPT were over-
general statements.
Our second and third hypothesis proposed,
respectively, that OGM as measured with the
SCEPT would be positively associated with de-
pression and depressive rumination (Hypothesis
2), and that OGM as measured with the standard
AMT would not show such association with
depression and rumination (Hypothesis 3). In
line with Hypothesis 2, OGM as measured with
the SCEPT was significantly correlated with both
depression scores (BDI) and depressive rumina-
tion scores (VARS), r(197) .18 and r(197) .15,
respectively (both psB.05). With respect to
Hypothesis 3 the results showed, as predicted,
no association between OGM as measured with
the AMT and both depression and depressive
rumination, respective rs being  .00 (p .98) and
 .03 (p .57). The absence of a correlation
between OGM on the AMT and both depression
and rumination is most likely due to the lack of
variance in number of overgeneral memories on
the AMT (restriction of range; cf. low base rate of
OGM).
All this seems to indicate that, by not explicitly
asking respondents to recall specific memories
using a sentence completion procedure, the
SCEPT is more sensitive*relative to the
AMT*to detect in some non-clinical respon-
dents the tendency to think back on past experi-
ences in an overgeneral way. The fact that OGM
on the SCEPT relates to depression and depres-
sive rumination in the same way as in clinically
depressed groups is reassuring as to the validity of
this method to assess OGM. These findings, then,
indicate that OGM as measured with the SCEPT
in non-clinical individuals likely reflects the same
clinically important cognitive phenomenon as
observed in clinical groups where the AMT is
used.
However, these results leave unanswered the
question of why the SCEPT, as compared to
the AMT, produces better data with respect to the
detection of OGM in non-clinical respondents. As
we have already pointed out in our introduction,
we believe that an important reason why the
AMT fails to detect OGM in non-clinical respon-
dents is its explicit instruction to recall specific
memories. As such, one possible and obvious
reason why the SCEPT succeeds at eliciting
overgeneral responding in some respondents is
because it omits the instruction to be specific and
encourages some generality (e.g., stems like ‘‘Last
year ...’’, ‘‘In the past ...’’). Still, the SCEPT
differs from the AMT in yet another respect than
the mere presence, respectively absence, of spe-
cificity instructions. That is, the SCEPTand AMT
also differ in terms of the procedure being used:
sentence completion versus free recall to cue
words. A second study was carried out to disen-
tangle this confound, and so to evaluate this
critical question: Does the SCEPT perform better
that the AMT because it omits the instruction
to be specific or because it involves sentence
completion?
For that purpose, we developed a SCEPT with
specificity instruction, which follows the same
sentence completion procedure as the standard
SCEPT but includes the added explicit instruction
for participants to be specific, similar to the
standard AMT. In Study 2, respondents filled
out this SCEPT with specificity instruction, fol-
lowing the standard SCEPT without specificity
instruction (see Study 1), a depression and a
rumination measure. In line with the above-
mentioned idea that an important reason why
the AMT fails to detect OGM in non-clinical
respondents is its explicit instruction to recall
specific memories, we expect that once we add
specificity instructions to the SCEPT, this task
will lose its ability to detect OGM. This would
indeed then show that the SCEPT’s improved
sensitivity (relative to the AMT) is attributable to
the omission of the specificity instruction rather
than to its procedural difference (i.e., sentence
completion format). More specifically, our pre-
dictions thus were (1) that the SCEPT with
specificity instruction would elicit less overgen-
eral responding than the standard SCEPTwithout
specificity instruction, (2) that OGM as measured
with the standard SCEPT would be positively
associated with depression and rumination, and
(3) that OGM as measured with the SCEPT with
specificity instruction would show no such asso-
ciations.
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Method
Participants
A total of 29 first-year psychology students
(all women) participated on a voluntary basis.
The mean age was 18.40 years (SD 0.62;
range 18 20).
Materials
The Sentence Completion for Events from the
Past test (SCEPT), the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI-II), and the Visual Analogue Rumination
Scales (VARS) were used as in Study 1.
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past
Test with Specificity Instruction (SCEPT-SI).T h e
same 11 sentence stems were used as in the
original SCEPT. However, in the instructions it
was now clearly stated that the stems should be
completed with reference to a specific memory.
The definition of a specific memory is explained
in exactly the same way as in the instructions of
the AMT. The SCEPT-SI is administered in a
written format. For the present study, the SCEPT-
SI was administered via the Internet (see Proce-
dure section below for more details).
Procedure
First-year psychology students at the Univer-
sity of Leuven (Belgium) were e-mailed with a
request to participate in the study on a voluntary
basis. In the e-mail, students were provided with
the address of a website where they could take
part in the study. Participants were presented the
SCEPT-SI, after providing general information
(age, sex, and a personalised code that allowed us
to link data gathered earlier*SCEPT, BDI-II,
and VARS*to the data of this internet survey).
A total of 37 students filled out the SCEPT-SI.
For the majority (78%) we also had their scores
on the earlier administered SCEPT (n 29), and
VARS (n 29). Thus, the final sample comprised
29 students. For 23 of these 29 students we also
had their scores on the BDI-II. The SCEPT,
VARS, and BDI-II were administered, in that
order, to first-year psychology students 3 weeks
earlier in a group session. They had completed
these three questionnaires in return for course
credit.
Results and discussion
Our first hypothesis was that the SCEPT without
specificity instruction would lead to a higher
prevalence of overgeneral responding than the
SCEPTwith specificity instruction (SCEPT-SI). In
line with this hypothesis, the mean proportion of
completions that were overgeneral on the SCEPT
(M .36, SD .13, range: .18 to .82) was signifi-
cantly higher than the mean proportion of com-
pletions that were overgeneral on the SCEPT-SI
(M .12, SD .16, range: .00 to .55), t(28) 6.04,
pB.001. Thus, whereas for the SCEPT without
specificity instruction a mean of 36% of the
completions were overgeneral statements, only a
mean of 12% of the completions were overgeneral
for the SCEPT with specificity instruction.
Our second and third hypotheses contended,
respectively, that OGM as measured with the
original SCEPT (without specificity instruction)
would be positively associated with depression
and depressive rumination (Hypothesis 2), and
that OGM as measured with the SCEPT with
specificity instruction (SCEPT-SI) would show no
such association with depression and rumination
(Hypothesis 3). In support of Hypothesis 2, OGM
as measured with the original SCEPT was sig-
nificantly correlated with depression scores (BDI-
II), r(23) .41, pB.05, and marginally significant
with depressive rumination scores (VARS),
r(29) .34, pB.07. Consistent with Hypothesis
3 the results revealed no association between
OGM as measured with the SCEPT-SI and both
depression and depressive rumination, respective
rs being .01 (p .97) and .05 (p .79). Similar to
what was the case for the standard AMT in Study
1, levels of OGM using the SCEPT-SI obviously
varied insufficiently to detect a relationship with
depression and rumination (cf. restriction of
range due to low OGM base rate).
The results suggest that, as predicted, the
SCEPT is a more sensitive tool for detecting
OGM as compared to the AMT because of
the omission of the instruction to be specific in
the SCEPT rather than because of the sentence
completion format (versus free recall to cue
words in the AMT).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present studies investigated the usefulness of
a sentence completion procedure to assess OGM,
SENTENCE COMPLETION AND OVERGENERAL MEMORY 503a known vulnerability marker for depression. By
tradition, researchers have been using a cue word
procedure for this purpose, known as the Auto-
biographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams &
Broadbent, 1986). However, whereas the AMT
has often been used in clinical populations (see
Williams, 2007), it has been applied relatively
infrequently in non-clinical populations. More-
over, our own studies showed that the AMT may
be, at least in such non-clinical groups, insuffi-
ciently sensitive to pick up OGM. For example,
the AMT typically leads to a low frequency of
overgeneral memories in non-clinical samples.
Also, OGM shows a different pattern of correla-
tions in non-clinical than in clinical samples with
other variables of relevance such as depression
and depressive rumination. As an alternative for
the AMT, we developed the Sentence Comple-
tion for Events from the Past Test (SCEPT) to
measure OGM in non-clinical populations.
In the first study, the SCEPTwas administered
to a group of first-year university students, along-
side a depression scale, a rumination measure,
and the traditional AMT. It was found, as
predicted, that the sentence completion method
led to a significantly higher proportion of over-
general responses (40%) than the traditional cue
word technique (AMT; less than 5%). The results
of Study 2, in which additionally a SCEPT was
administered that asked participants to complete
sentences with specific memories, indicated that
the SCEPT’s superior performance in eliciting
OGM in non-clinical participants is most likely
due to the omission of the specificity instruction
rather than to its procedural difference (i.e.,
sentence completion format). These results thus
suggest that, by not explicitly instructing respon-
dents to retrieve specific personal past experi-
ences, the SCEPT is relatively more sensitive to
detect non-clinical respondents’ tendency to think
of past experiences in an overgeneral way.
Importantly, the data of both studies also
revealed that level of depression and depressive
rumination were positively associated with OGM
as measured with the SCEPT, but not when
assessed using the AMT (Study 1) or when
assessed using a sentence completion with speci-
ficity instruction (SCEPT-SI; Study 2). The latter
finding is likely due to restriction of range
resulting from low base rates of OGM on the
AMT and SCEPT-SI (floor effect). The finding
that OGM on the SCEPT is related to depression
and depressive rumination in non-clinical groups,
just as in clinically depressed groups when the
AMT is used, further underscores the validity
of this method to assess OGM. In other words,
OGM as measured with the SCEPT in non-
clinical individuals likely reflects the same
clinically important cognitive phenomenon as
observed in clinical groups where the AMT is
used.
The whole of the present results thus suggest
that the SCEPT represents a potentially valuable
instrument to meaningfully assess OGM in non-
clinical individuals. In terms of (primary) preven-
tion, then, the SCEPT may prove useful to
identify individuals who are at risk for depression;
that is, individuals who have a tendency to recall
past events in an overgeneral form. So whereas
previously, using the AMT, this known marker for
depression or depression-proneness was relatively
difficult to detect in non-clinical respondents, the
present sentence completion method opens per-
spectives in this respect.
Finally, a number of limitations of the present
studies deserve mention. First, participants in the
studies were predominantly women. Thus, it
remains to be seen to what extent our findings
will generalise to male respondents, although we
are not aware of any report of gender differences
in the literature on OGM. Second, order of tests
was not counterbalanced, neither across testing
sessions nor within testing sessions. As such, we
cannot exclude possible order effects. However,
the fixed order of test presentation, namely that
the SCEPT was always presented first, was
motivated by the following assumption. If we
had administered the standard AMT or SCEPT
with specificity instructions (SCEPT-SI) before
the regular SCEPT (with no specificity instruc-
tions), this would undoubtedly have influenced
respondents in the way they would respond to the
SCEPT. For example, they might assume that
they were expected to complete the regular
SCEPT stems with specific material, similar
to the AMT or SCEPT-SI (unintended transfer-
ence of instructions or response style ‘‘mind set’’).
This then might cause the SCEPT to miss the
detection of one’s habitual retrieval style. Third,
formal diagnoses (in particular depression and
history of depression) were not assessed, leaving
unanswered the question whether level of OGM
as measured with the SCEPT is higher in clini-
cally depressed or formerly depressed students as
compared to students with elevated BDI scores
who do not fulfil the full criteria for current or
past depression. Future studies, including formal
504 RAES ET AL.assessment of clinical diagnosis, are thus war-
ranted.
Future studies should also examine the pre-
dictive validity of the SCEPT for emotional
distress in response to stressful life events (cf.
Gibbs & Rude, 2004), as well as for depression
onset and depressive relapse. It will also be
important for future research to investigate the
validity of the SCEPT in clinical samples. Besides
the potential clinical relevance of this sentence
completion procedure, the SCEPT may also
prove useful to select participants for experimen-
tal studies investigating the underlying processes
involved in this important cognitive phenomenon.
Also, such a sentence completion memory task
might be viably used as an evaluation tool for
experimental procedures intended to influence
OGM. Future studies will show to what extent
these ideas apply to real facts.
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APPENDIX 1
Dutch and English instructions and items of the
Sentence Completion for Events from the Past
Test (SCEPT).
Instructies/Instructions
Zinaanvultaak
Hieronder vindt u elf zinnen. Eigenlijk zijn het
maar halve zinnen. Want wat er telkens staat
geschreven, is enkel het begin van een zin. Het is
de bedoeling dat u elke zin verder aanvult. U mag
de zinnen aanvullen zoals u wil, zolang het maar
aansluit bij hetgeen er al geschreven staat. Let er
ook op dat u zorgt dat elke zin over iets anders
gaat.
Sentence completion task
Below you will find eleven sentences. Actually
these are only parts of sentences, because only the
beginning of each of the sentences is provided. The
purpose of the task is for you to complete each of
the sentences. You can complete the sentences any
way you want, just as long as what you write
corresponds to the provided stem. Also make sure
that each of the sentences is on a different topic.
Items/Items
1. Ik herinner me nog goed hoe .../I still remember well
how ...
2. Ik weet nog dat ik .../I still recall how/that I ...
3. Vorig jaar .../Last year ...
4. Vroeger .../In the past ...
5. Vorige week heb ik .../Last week I ...
6. Ik zie nog zo voor me hoe .../I can still picture how ...
7. Als ik terugdenk aan .../When I think back to/of ...
8. Ik zal nooit vergeten .../I will never forget ...
9. Het belangrijkste dat ik ooit heb .../The most important
thing that I have ever ...
10. Vorig jaar heb ik .../Last year I ...
11. Toen ik .../At the time when I ...
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Sample responses for different coding cate-
gories for the Sentence Completion for Events
from the Past Test (SCEPT).
‘‘Specific memory’’
I still remember well how ...sad I was the day my
grandfather died.
I will never forget ...that a friend threw me a
surprise party when I turned sixteen.
Last week ...I held my baby nephew in my arms
for the very first time.
‘‘Categoric memory’’
I can still picture how ...my grandmother used to
play games with me when I was little.
Last year ...I went to school by bike everyday.
In the past ...I used to avoid other people at
social gatherings.
‘‘Extended memory’’
When I think back to/of ...my time in junior
high, I feel happy.
Last year I ...went on scout camp for a week as a
cook.
I still recall that I ...was ill for two weeks in a
row last year.
‘‘Semantic associate’’
In the past ...I was a very shy person.
The most important thing that I have ever ...had
and have, is my family.
In the past ...I had short hair.
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